Within moral psychology, theories focusing on the conceptualization and empirical measurement of people’s morality in terms of general moral values –such as Moral Foundation Theory- (implicitly) assume general moral values to be relevant concepts for the explanation and prediction of behavior in everyday life. However, a solid theoretical and empirical foundation for this idea remains work in progress. In this study we explore this relationship between general moral values and daily life behavior through a conceptual analysis and an empirical study. (...) Our conceptual analysis of the moral value-moral behavior relationship suggests that the effect of a generally endorsed moral value on moral behavior is highly context dependent. It requires the manifestation of several phases of moral decision-making, each influenced by many contextual factors. We expect that this renders the empirical relationship between generic moral values and people’s concrete moral behavior indeterminate. Subsequently, we empirically investigate this relationship in three different studies. We relate two different measures of general moral values -the Moral Foundation Questionnaire and the Morality As Cooperation Questionnaire- to a broad set of self-reported morally relevant daily life behaviors (including adherence to COVID-19 measures and participation in voluntary work). Our empirical results are in line with the expectations derived from our conceptual analysis: the considered general moral values are poor predictors of the selected daily life behaviors. Furthermore, moral values that were tailored to the specific context of the behavior showed to be somewhat stronger predictors. Together with the insights derived from our conceptual analysis, this indicates the relevance of the contextual nature of moral decision-making as a possible explanation for the poor predictive value of general moral values. Our findings suggest that the investigation of morality’s influence on behavior by expressing and measuring it in terms of general moral values may need revision. (shrink)

As AI Systems become increasingly autonomous, they are expected to engage in decision-making processes that have moral implications. In this research we integrate theoretical and empirical lines of thought to address the matters of moral reasoning and moral uncertainty in AI Systems. We reconceptualize the metanormative framework for decision-making under moral uncertainty and we operationalize it through a latent class choice model. The core idea being that moral heterogeneity in society can be codified in terms of a small number of (...) classes with distinct moral preferences and that this codification can be used to express moral uncertainty of an AI. Choice analysis allows for the identification of classes and their moral preferences based on observed choice data. Our reformulation of the metanormative framework is theory-rooted and practical in the sense that it avoids runtime issues in real time applications. To illustrate our approach we conceptualize a society in which AI Systems are in charge of making policy choices. While one of the systems uses a baseline morally certain model, the other uses a morally uncertain model. We highlight cases in which the AI Systems disagree about the policy to be chosen, thus illustrating the need to capture moral uncertainty in AI systems. (shrink)

" Le concept d'un être infini est plus simple que celui d'un être bon ou d'un être vrai et autres semblables, parce que " infini " n'est pas une sorte d'attribut ou une propriété de l'être ou de tout ce dont il est prédiqué.

Classical theories of truth are monistic, since they fundamentally search for the essence of truth. The correspondence theory of truth is the most representative in this regard. There are several difficulties with the essentialist theories of truth, which led to the emergence of several alternatives. The purpose of this article is to critically evaluate three of them: the pragmatic theory of truth, the deflationary theory and the pluralistic approach. I argue for overcoming monism and for accepting pluralism in our understanding (...) of truth. At the same time, I argue – from a wittgensteinian point of view – for abandoning the attempt to build a general philosophical theory of truth. I plead for limiting the philosopher’s role to the clarification of the specific ways in which the concept of truth is used in various forms of life and areas of scientific investigation. Multiple uses of the concept of truth in different thematic areas cannot be synthesized, properly speaking, through a particular philosophical theory. (shrink)

Cet article entend montrer comment, quand il expose la doctrine dite Assumptus homo, le philosophe et théologien latin Jean Duns Scot (1265 - 1308) prend appui sur le théologien grec Jean de Damas (c. 675 - c. 749), concernant trois points principaux: dans le Christ, la nature humaine est assumée par la personne du Verbe intégralement; elle est assumée dans un individu, non dans une personne; éternellement et temporellement. Le présent article complète l'étude des rapports entre les deux auteurs, après (...) l'article paru dans le numéro 3-4 la revue Chôra (2005-2006), sous le titre «Jean de Damas et Jean Duns Scot surl'infinité de l'essence divine». (shrink)

Indo além do que já fora dito por E.Gilson, e por vezes discordando dele, o autormostra a importância de Avicena em algunstemas fundamentais da metafísica de DunsScotus. Entre eles, a questão do objeto da meta-fisica, a da univocidade do ser e a da naturezacomum.

ABSTRACT: In reaffirming the intimate link between mind and life, John Duns Scotus is faithful to Augustine. His conception of the rational soul, however, differs from Augustine’s trinitarian image, since he stresses the difference between intellect and memory on the one hand, and will on the other hand. He also departs from Augustine by attributing, in his theory of intelligible species, a real, if partial, causal role to the external object in their generation. The principle that there cannot be more (...) reality in an effect than in its cause is true only of the total cause, and not of a partial cause, because an inferior partial cause can concur with a superior partial cause, such as the intellect, to produce a common effect, the perfection of which surpasses its own. (shrink)

The aim of this study is to determine several points of reference regarding the way in which Karl Popper built up his philosophical discourse. I locate two specific ways in which Popper interpreted and used ideas belonging to other philosophers. Thus I distinguish in Popper between a projective hermeneutics and an ideological hermeneutics . In so doing I also highlight the considerable asymmetry between a representationalist hermeneutics, and a projective and, respectively, an ideological one. Whereas in the first case the (...) interpreter wishes to unveil a truth about the philosophical text, in the other two he is rather expressing a desire to talk about himself, his own beliefs and convic¬tions, or about the beliefs of his community of reference. (shrink)

In this paper I pursue two goals. Firstly, I try to evaluate how Susan Haack receives and categorically rejects Rorty's anti-epistemological message from Philosophy and the Mirror of the Nature and some subsequent writings. I reconstruct Haack's counterarguments and Rorty's responses to these counterarguments. Secondly, I propose to deconstruct the theoretical position from which Haack orchestrates her attack on Rorty. On the one hand I show that she assumes a series of classical metaphysical presuppositions that are difficult to accept today, (...) which predisposes her to a lack of hermeneutical flexibility and clarity. On the other hand, at least some of Haack's arguments against Rorty are erroneous. Following Michael Williams, I point out that Rorty's position in Mirror is not against knowledge, since it raises questions about the legitimacy of epistemology. The challenge of my approach is not to defend Rorty, but rather to examine the mechanism of a charge against him in the name of a pretended philosophical correctness. I call this type of charge “hermeneutics of annihilation”. Haack's hermeneutics of annihilation is a pseudo-hermeneutics, since her goal is not to understand the stake of Rorty's philosophy exposed in Mirror. She only understood, from the point of view of an epistemologist ideology, that this work would be a threat to Truth, Knowledge, Epistemology, Science, and Reason. (shrink)

The first part of this book gives a full account of the textual tradition of Epictetus' Encheiridion and of its three Christian adaptations. The second part consists of critical editions of the four texts.

Among modern scholars of ancient Greek it is almost universally accepted that the historical present is only used for events and not for states and activities. A survey of the extant complete tragedies shows that this view is untenable: there are passages where static verbs like κεῖμαι ‘lie’ and εὕδω ‘sleep’ are used in the historical present and where the historical present describes a state or activity which is extended in time. On the one hand this shows that punctuality or (...) decisiveness cannot be regarded as the basic function of the historical present; on the other it leads to new interpretations of a number of passages in Greek tragedy. (shrink)

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Journal Name: Philologus Issue: Ahead of print.

The Interpolation Theorem, first formulated and proved by W. Craig fifty years ago for predicate logic, has been extended to many other logical frameworks and is being applied in several areas of computer science. We give a short overview, and focus on the theory of software systems and modules. An algebra of theories TA is presented, with a nonstandard interpretation of the existential quantifier ∃. In TA, the interpolation property of the underlying logic corresponds with the quantifier combination property ∃Σ (...) ∃П S ≡ ∃(Σ ∪ П) S. It is shown how the Modularization Theorem, the Factorization Lemma and the Normal Form Theorem for module expressions can be proved in TA. (shrink)

A leitura que Hegel faz da antinomia em Kant permite entender que as considerações deste não estão isentas de pressupostos antropológicos e de que, portanto, ele estuda a finitude das categorias nelas mesmas, mas em sua pertinência ao "sujeito", que, no final das contas, é um sujeito "psicológico". Eis o interesse que há em retormar os textos de Hegel para fazer jus à "arte de ler" hegeliana.